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Abstract
This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and
unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global
environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of nego-
tiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce
their emissions. we call this behaviour precautionary commitment.
Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection
from the environmental issue. we also show that the emergence of a
non-co-ordinated global co-operation can result from a strategic action
from the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition cre-
ate an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating
their emissions.
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11 Introduction
This paper deals with the question of cooperation in the presence of global
environmental problems such as emissions of greenhouse gases, the protec-
tion of the ozone layer. These problems are global in so far as they con-
cern the whole planet not only by their scope but also by their irreversible
consequences such as climate change, ice melting and desertiﬁcation. As
Barrett (1991, 1992, 1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1992, 1993) or Chander
and Tulkens (1992) have pointed out, such environmental problems cannot
be tackled eﬀectively in isolation by any country, they require international
coordination of environmental policies. This leads to international confer-
ences aiming at signing agreements concerning the reduction of emissions
such as carbon dioxide (CO2). But in practice, only a subset of the countries
involved in the pollution problem agrees upon pollution control measures.
The solution of a global problem does not always imply global cooperation.
Cooperation can be only partial and not global.
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD hereafter) is often used to describe trans-
boundary environmental problems (Snidal 1985, Ostrom 1990). As we know,
the issue of this game leads to a stable non-cooperative solution which is sub-
optimal according to Pareto. This solution is dominated by a cooperative
solution which unfortunately cannot be reached spontaneously. According to
the PD, an agreement will not be signed by all countries. If a country were
sure of the commitment of the other countries on a cooperative solution, it
would be tempted to desert the agreement and, as a consequence, obtain part
of beneﬁts resulting from the cooperative behaviour of the other countries
without paying any costs. However, practice shows that it does not always
apply since some agreements eﬀectively are reached.
It is possible to explain cooperation in PD by consideration the PD su-
pergame which is the (inﬁnite) repetition of the basic PD-game for which
the Folk Theorem shows that mutual cooperation is an equilibrium out-
come. G¨ uth et al (1991) show however that this theorem is inconsistent with
stronger rationality requirements. Axelrod (1984) proposes the Tit-for-Tat
strategy for the repeated PD. A player choosing Tit-for-Tat begins with the
cooperative strategy and repeats the last choice of his opponent in later pe-
riods. This strategy does not loose against a defective player but wins a
lot when confronted with a cooperative player. Cooperation in a repeated
PD will be global and not partial. This result remains unsatisfactorily since
international environmental agreements involve few countries.
Strategic bargaining models seem an attractive theoretical framework to
2analyse the coordination of environmental policies (Chen 1997, Rotillon and
Tazda¨ ıt 1996, Rotillon et al 1996), but this theory depends on a crucial
assumption. Concerning the axiomatic and related players strategic envi-
ronment, it is commonly envisioned that agents negotiate assuming that in
case of a setting failure, the prevailing situation is as if negotiation had
never taken place: the status-quo in which all countries defect the environ-
mental cause. Hence, countries should have no other choice than cooperate
since the non-cooperative outcome is shown as being the worse of the al-
ternative. Nevertheless, because of the public good status of environmental
items, the so called ”Tragedy” of the commons property good (Hardin, 1968)
-characterized by the domination of defection behaviour- will pertain, nego-
tiation being then perceived as exerting a neutral inﬂuence on countries’
behaviour. Grasping negotiation on that angle is not relevant. Countries
organize indeed negotiation in order to improve their welfare. Negotiation
is an attempt to resolve potential irreversibility environmental degradations
could lead to. There is thus a will for cooperation and even in the eventuality
of disagreement, there is no interest for countries to remain on that state.
It is pertinent to assume that countries, in the absence of coordination, ﬁrm
up their cooperation will by adopting a unilateral environmental policy. As
ﬁrstly mentioned by Kaitala et al (1992a, b), countries can also start to re-
duce emissions unilaterally as the result of the inﬂuence of a border country.
Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection to the
environmental issue. In other words, absence of coordination does not mean
absence of cooperation, countries can opt for a unilateral commitment.
The aim of this paper is to characterize the reasons of partial coopera-
tion and the conditions under which countries are willing to reduce emissions
unilaterally without coordination. Particularly, we focus on the link between
group cooperation and unilateral commitment behaviour of some countries.
The cooperation behaviour can occur inside a coalition when an agreement is
reached or outside in case of a failure in the international bargaining process.
We associate this last behaviour with a precautionary unilateral commitment.
This commitment diﬀers from Hoel’s model (1991) since it does not appear
before the bargaining process. When countries have the choice between coop-
eration or defection, our results show that an international agreement always
involves a sub-group of countries. This result is derived from the concept of
coalition stability introduced by D’Aspremont et al (1983) in the context of
cartel formation. A coalition is said to be stable if none of its members want
to get out and none of the non-members want to get in. The explanation
is well-known. There is a private cost for a country to belong to a coalition
while the coalition’s beneﬁts are public goods for all the involved countries
3and not only for the cooperating ones. We also show that although this pre-
cautionary commitment has less impact than global cooperation, it has also
a lower cost for the involved countries and it leads to less defection. The
gains made by coordination of environmental policies are so important that
it creates an incentive to defection, while the beneﬁts created by a unilateral
commitment movement are less important.
The next step of the analysis conciliates these two forms of behaviour.
We develop a new framework which allows us to have both partial coopera-
tion and unilateral commitment in the same static game. We suppose that
when an agreement emerges, the non-signatory countries have the choice be-
tween unilateral commitment and defection. In this case, we show that the
main characteristic of the coalition is the incentive it creates for all the non-
members to commit unilaterally. The beneﬁts made by the initial coalition
of size two are so low that the outsiders prefer to reduce their emissions
without coordination rather than free-ride in order to improve their welfare.
This training eﬀect leads to non-coordinated global cooperation. The global
emissions reduction will be higher than the previous one without training
eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model is introduced
and the partial cooperation and precautionary unilateral commitment strate-
gies are deﬁned. Section 3 analyses how the training eﬀect due to the emer-
gence of a small coalition can lead to non-coordinated global cooperation.
Finally, the last section concludes.
2 Partial Cooperation and precautionary Uni-
lateral Commitment
2.1 The model
Assume negotiation takes place among N identical countries, indexed by i =
1,...,n. If an agreement is reached between j countries, 2 ≤ j ≤ n, only the
members of the j-size coalition will reduce their emissions. This is a necessary
assumption to the extent to its corresponds to the reality. More precisely,
the change we observe is based on two trends1. Firstly, any agreement to
be signed is only signed by a restricted number of countries. Secondly, any
1Truly speaking, this change relies on three trends. We remark that, after its formation,
the initial coalition has been enlarged with the entry of additional countries. However, it
did not lead to a convergence towards the participation of all countries to the agreement.
4environmental policy is not adopted by a non-signatory country. Then, when
a coalition is emerging, cooperation remains the result of the only countries
that are members of the coalition. We should also add that the threat of
”no action” is regularly considered by developing countries in the course of
climate change negotiations. By introducing this alternative in our analysis,
it becomes possible to determine its relevance.
Turning to notation, let Πi(j) be the payoﬀ of a country i belonging to
a j-size coalition and Π−i(j − 1) its payoﬀ when it does not join the j-size
coalition. We assume that the total number of signatories is common knowl-
edge. In the event of failure in the international bargaining process, some
countries can decide to commit unilaterally in order to reduce their pollu-
tant emissions while the other ones decide to defect. We call this behaviour
precautionary unilateral commitment. Countries behave individually and re-
duce their emissions without coordination. In this case, we suppose that
a country does not know how many countries will adopt a precautionary
behaviour. Let Πi(k) denote the payoﬀ of i when k countries (i included)
adopt a unilaterally commitment strategy and Π−i(k − 1) its payoﬀ when it
adopts a free rider behaviour and takes advantage of the unilateral action
of the (k − 1) other countries. Finally, when nobody reduces their pollutant




i ) be the probability that k (resp. k − 1) countries
commit unilaterally knowing that i cooperates (resp. defects). We have
Φ
k
i = p(k countries ∈ K/i ∈ K)
Θ
k−1
i = p(k − 1 countries ∈ K/i 6∈ K)
where K is the set of the countries, 2 ≤ k ≤ n, which adopt a precautionary
behaviour in the event of failure in international negotiation. We denote J
the set of the members of the coalition of size j.
The payoﬀs of country i, i ∈ N for the diﬀerent strategy combinations
are listed in the matrix:
i/. Coalition No-Coalition
Cooperation Πi(j) Πi(k,1)







Π−i(k − 1,0) = Θ
k−1




i Π−i(k − 1) (2)
5Eq (1) states that in case of failure of bargaining, k countries (i included)
can decide to reduce unilaterally their pollutant emissions with a probability
Φk
i or only one country with a probability Φ1
i. When a country i acts as a
free-rider, it takes advantage of the unilateral actions of the (k − 1) other
countries with a probability Θ
k−1
i (eq 2)2.
As in Barrett (1991), the ith country’s payoﬀ function can be written:











where a, b and c > 0 are positive parameters, Qn =
P
qi is global abatement
and qi the abatement of the country i. Each country beneﬁts from global
reductions of pollution. The gross beneﬁt function is concave and increases
in Qn. The abatement costs faced by each country depends only on its own
abatement. The cost function is convex and increases in qi. Eq (3) thus
deﬁnes the net beneﬁts of a country i.





































When an agreement is not reached, only k countries will decide to commit
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i (k) > 0 and Q
c − Q
nc > 0 (10)
It means that when the number of cooperative countries is the same, the net
beneﬁts for country i to join the coalition are greater than its beneﬁts from
committing unilaterally. Global abatement is greater in the ﬁrst case than
in the second one.
Remark 2
∀ j and k such that:
j
2 ≤








i (k) ≤ 0 (12)
Consequently, for some values of k and j, it is more interesting for a country
i to adopt a precautionary behaviour rather than to join a coalition of size
(j − 1). This appears when j is small relatively to n.
2.2 Results
Proposition 1 An international agreement consists of at least two, but never
more than three signatories. More precisely, for a country i, the cooperation
strategy is the best reply to the desertion behaviour of non-signatory coun-
tries:
• j = 2 for n ≥ b/2c ≥ 2
• j = 3 for n ≥ 16b/c
Proof. The cooperation strategy is the best reply to the desertion be-









−i(j − 1) =
a2b2(j − 1)2n(b(j − 1)2 + 2cn)
2(b(j − 1)2 + cn)2 (14)
This gives the polynomial equation in j
P(j) = −bj
4 + 4bj
3 − (6b + cn)j
2 + 4(b + cn)j − b − 2cn ≥ 0 (15)
7If n ≥ b/2c, the inequality (15) is veriﬁed for j = 2 and if n ≥ 16b/c, (15) is
veriﬁed for j = 3.
Eq(13) represents the internal stability condition, such that a country
i would not wish to withdraw from the coalition. We can also determine
the external stability condition. A country i would not wish to join a size-j
coalition since its payoﬀ is greater when it defects. Formally we have for a





i(j + 1) ≥ 0 (16)
Eq (16) is veriﬁed for n ≤ 16b/c. It means that a third country has no incen-
tive to join a coalition formed by two countries when n is small. However,
for large n, the size of the coalition is equal to 3.
The conditions (13) and (16) ensure that a coalition is internally and ex-
ternally stable. This deﬁnition, used by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), is due
to D’Aspremont et al (1983), Donsimoni et al (1986). The proposition means
that the number3 of countries involved in an agreement does not exceed 3.
Stability plays a crucial role here. Its introduction allows for a self-enforcing
agreement. First, we note that global cooperation cannot be reached because
the incentive for a country to free-ride rises with the size of the coalition. As
each country expects the same attitude, none will sign the agreement. Par-
tial cooperation is more the rule than an exception. If a signatory goes back
on its decision, it will not reduce its emissions. As a consequence, it does not
bear any costs. However, a notable compensation exists. The desertion of
the country from the agreement entails a reduction of the number of cooper-
ating countries, which weakens the original agreement: remaining countries
are indeed brought about to reduce their emissions’ level. In fact, a signatory
will attempt to withdraw only if the saving in abatement costs compensates
the consequent proﬁt loss. And vice-versa, any country that wishes to ac-
cede to the agreement decides to reduce its emissions and consents at the
same time to bear the costs associated with the abatement demanded by the
agreement. The membership of an additional country nevertheless reinforces
the agreement, since the other member countries of the coalition are urged
to increase their reduction level. Let’s underline that this result is possible
only if the proﬁt increase collected by the new signatory exceeds the cost
3Note that ∀ values of b, c and n, P(J = 4) < 0. Contrary to the numerical simulations
of Barrett’s model (1991), the size of the coalition does not rise according to the values
of b and c. We explain this diﬀerence by the fact that in Barrett’s model, the only choice
for a country is to act cooperatively or non-cooperatively while in this paper each country
decides whether or not to adopt an environmental policy.
8increase it follows. There is a private cost for a country to belong to a coali-
tion while the coalition’s beneﬁts appear as public goods for all the involved
countries and not only for the cooperating ones. To resume, a coalition of
size 2 or 3 allows a coordination of environmental policies without incentive
to defection.
Self-enforcement is all the more signiﬁcant since there does not exist any
organization suﬃciently inﬂuential to make sure that the treaty should be
respected. Of course, international institutions exist but any of them do
not have the power or the duty to impose a behaviour onto one or several
nations. This accordingly requires an agreement between the diﬀerent parties
involved.
Now, consider a stable j-coalition. One can ask if the j countries can
enlarge the coalition size by implementing utility transfers to countries lack-
ing incentives to join. Note that an utility transfer T is conceivable ﬁrst, if
at the most its amount equals the beneﬁt perceived by the j countries from
the widening of the coalition : T > Πc
−i(j) − Πc
i(j + 1), and second, if its
amount is at least equal to cost for the j +1th country to join the coalition:
T ≤ Πc
i(j + 1) − Πc





i(j + 1) < T ≤ Π
c
i(j + 1) − Π
c
i(j)
The existence of T would signify that the coalition can be enlarged by a
self-ﬁnanced policy. This result is however clouded by the external stability
condition which states that the j countries constituting the stable j-coalition
will tend to leave the coalition as soon as another country joins. We can
conclude that if a j-coalition is stable, utility transfers won’t enlarge the
coalition.
We should also observe that the comparison of our results to Barrett’s
ones (1991) leads to the following remarks : playing qi = 0 is not an indi-
vidually rational strategy for non-signatory countries. As soon as a stable
coalition is emerging, it is a better choice for non-signatory countries to en-
visage a reduction of their GHG emissions. Nevertheless, the eﬀort to be
achieved by a non-signatory country will be less important than the eﬀort
of signatory country. It results from this that the threat of non-signatory
countries to collectively deviate from the Nash equilibrium (as deﬁned by
Barrett, 1991) is not at all credible. Consequently, whatever the behaviour
of non-signatory parties, the interest of the coalition members is to keep to
their cooperative behaviour. This is the reason why, in our model, as in Bar-
rett’s one (but also Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993), the coalition of cooperating
countries reaches the same size.
9Proposition 2 In the event of failure of international negotiation, some
countries can decide to adopt a precautionary behaviour while the other ones
defect. The number of these countries depends on the beliefs about the other
countries. Formally, the non-commitment strategy is the best rply strategy if
and only if:
p(k − 1) ≥ (17)
[F(kp(k) + p(1)) + M(p(1) − kp(k)) + QM1/2kp(k)](n − U)T
(n − k + 1)RSU
Proof. The desertion strategy is the best reply to a precautionary com-
mitment movement if and only if:
Π
nc
−i(k − 1,0) − Π
nc



























where F = b2k2+2bckn, M = c2n2, Q = bk2+2ckn−b, R = (b+cn)(bk+cn)2,
S = bk2 +2ckn−2bk +b−2cn, T = [b(k −1)+cn]2. It is the case when the
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When country i has decided to sign the agreement with the other (k − 1)























10By substitution in (21), we have (17) with U =
Pn
r=1 p(r)r.
In the event of failure in international negotiation, this proposition shows
that some countries can decide to adopt a precautionary behaviour while the
other ones defect. In particular, a country will not commit unilaterally if its
beliefs about the unilateral behaviour of the other countries are strong (see
21). When a country expects a large unilateral commitment movement, its
incentive to defect rises. Our results show that although this precautionary
commitment has less impact than global cooperation, it has also a lower cost
for the involved countries and it leads to less defection. Defection is the
main problem. When countries decide to sign an agreement, they have to
withstand the defection of other countries. So, when bargaining fails, it might
be more interesting for countries to adopt a precautionary behavior. Their
individual contributions are lower and it appears less costly for countries
which commit to support the defection of the other countries. The gains
made by coordination of environmental policies are so important that they
creates an incentive to defect while those made by a unilateral commitment
movement are less important than the preceding.
Given this result, it is interesting to analyse the failure of the Conference
of Parties on Climate Change, held in Buenos Aires in November 1998. The
United States rejected the EU proposal to adopt a CO2 emissions reduction
programme. They were arguing that they would sign such an agreement
only when developing countries would also join. Following this refusal, every
country kept to its initial position; in other words, no environmental policy
was decided. However, we learn from proposition (2) that the situation could
have been radically diﬀerent. Despite the failure of the negotiation, some
countries could have envisaged to commit unilaterally. This commitment
would have then led to induce a potentially large training eﬀect. Even if such
a commiment would not have the impact of a global agreement, it would
have facilitated further negotiation. Just like the CFC example displayed
it, it is easier to envisage a global agreement when some leading countries
already engaged into a cooperation than when none country adopted a given
environmental policy. Indeed, as soon as a link between chlorine release
into the stratosphere by CFCs and the potential catalytic destruction of the
ozone layer, the United States banned in 1978 the use of CFC 11 and 12 in
aerosols. Scandinavian countries followed the policy initiated by the United
States, thus conﬁrming the idea of a training eﬀect. Cooperation reached
again a wider level with the signature of the Montreal Protocol in 1987 with
much more countries involved.
113 Training Eﬀect and Non-Coordinated Global
Cooperation
In the previous section, we considered a symmetric conﬁguration. Interna-
tional negotiation can succeed or not. If the negotiation fails, some countries
can decide to commit unilaterally. Now we introduce two supplementary
assumptions. Firstly, we suppose that when an agreement emerges, the non-
signatories have the choice between individually rational commitment and
defection. Secondly, the cooperative countries can determine precisely the
number of countries which adopt an individually rational commitment. This
new framework allows us to have both partial cooperation and unilateral
commitment in the same static game. As in Barrett’s model, we consider
two levels of emissions reduction. In this context, we show that the emer-
gence of a small coalition creates an incentive for all non-members to reduce
their emissions unilaterally. Cooperation is then global and non-coordinated.
Remark 3
If eq (30) is fulﬁlled, then it is proﬁtable for the k = n − j countries to
commit unilaterally.
Proof. Consider the case where the members of the coalition expect
that k countries will decide to reduce their emissions unilaterally. We have
to solve simultaneously the following maximization programs:
max
q1,...,qj















b[a(qi + Q(k−1) + Qj) −
1
2n


























bj2 + cn + bk
(26)
where Qc(j/k) is the global abatement of the j-size coalition knowing that
k countries will decide to adopt an individually rational commitment and
Qnc(k/j) the global abatement of the k commitment movement knowing
that j countries cooperate within the coalition and coordinate their policies.
If we compare the global abatement of the j-size coalition (5) with (25), we
12have for k ≥ 1 : Qc > Qc(j/k). When the insiders of the coalition expect no
emissions reduction by the remaining countries, their global and individual
abatement levels are greater. The net beneﬁt of one member of the coalition




a2b2n(2kbj2 + bk2 + 2cnk + bj4 + cnj2)
2(bj2 + cn + bk)2 (27)
Let Πnc
i (k/j) denote the payoﬀ of a country i which adopts a unilateral
strategy when a coalition of size-j appears, knowing that k − 1 countries
adopt the same behaviour and the members of the coalition have expected




a2b2n(2kbj2 + bk2 + 2cnk + bj4 + 2cnj2 − cn)
2(bj2 + cn + bk)2 (28)
We must check that
Π
nc
i (k/j) − Π
c









2 ≥ 0 (30)
This condition holds for k = n − j.
Furthermore, it does not mean that all the non-members of the coalition
will decide to adopt an individually rational commitment. This movement
will be eﬀective only if its stability is guaranteed, that is to say when a
country belonging to the k-movement does not wish to withdraw. This leads
to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The emergence of a small coalition of size 2 creates an in-
centive for all the non-signatory countries to commit unilaterally.
Proof. A country will not decide to withdraw from the commitment
movement if and only if:
Π
nc
i (k/j) − Π
nc










2 ≥ 0 (32)
In order to determine the value of k, we have to ﬁnd the size of the coalition.
We must analyse two cases according to whether a country which withdraws
13from the coalition decides to adopt an individually rational commitment or












2 + a1j + a0 ≥ 0 (34)
with the coeﬃcient a6 = −b2, a5 = 4b2, a4 = −(7b2 + 2bcn + 2b2k), a3 =
8bcn + 8b2 + 4b2k, a2 = −10bcn − 4b2 − c2n2 − b2k2 − 2b2k − 2bkcn, a1 =













2 + a1j + a0 ≥ 0 (36)
a6 = −b2, a5 = 4b2, a4 = −(6b2 + 2bcn + 2b2k), a3 = 4b2 + 8bcn + 4b2k,
a2 = −(b2k2 + 8bcn + b2 + 2bkcn + c2n2 + 2b2k, a1 = 4bcn + 4c2n2 + 4bcnk
and a0 = −(bcn + 2bkcn + 2c2n2).
Eqs (34) and (36) simultaneously hold for j = 2 under the respective
conditions :
n ≥ A =
b
c
(k − 2 + 2
√
1 + k + k2) (37)
and
n ≥ B =
b
4c
(2k − 7 + 3
√
9 + 4k + 4k2) (38)
For n ≥ max(A,B), the emergence of a coalition of size-two will be followed
by a k = n − j unilateral commitment movement4.
Contrary to the previous section where a unilateral commitment move-
ment occurs only in the case of a failure in the international bargaining, this
new framework allows us to have cooperation within the coalition and also
outside by unilateral commitment and as a consequence two levels of emis-
sions reduction. Since the emission reduction of the coalition is lower than
in the previous case (Qc(j = 2/k = n−2)), the signatories of the agreement
create an incentive for the non-members to adopt an emission reduction. The
main characteristic of the coalition is the creation of incentives for outsiders
to reduce their emissions. The beneﬁts made by the coalition are so low that
4To see this, substitute A and B in (32).
14the other countries prefer to commit rather than free-ride. This unilateral
movement improves the welfare both of insiders and outsiders. The strat-
egy leads to greater global abatement compared with the case where such a
unilateral movement does not exist. Formally we have :
Q
c(j = 2/k = n − 2) + Q
nc(k = n − 2/j = 2) > Q
c(j = 2/k = 0) (39)
In such a context, the emergence of a small coalition implies a training eﬀect
which leads to a non-coordinated global cooperation. So, it is necessary that
a coalition emerges in order to enforce a reduction of the non-members.
Note that if n < max(A,B), the number of countries concerned by the
environmental problem is then very low. In this context, a 2-coalition can
not be organised to the extent to it could not incite non-signatory countries
to adopt a given environmental policy. Indeed, for n very small, reductions
envisaged by a 2-coalition would be suﬃcient for non-signatory countries
to get substantial enough gains as to prefer defection, thus leading to the
absence of training eﬀect.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to ﬁnd out the link between group cooperation
and unilateral commiment of some countries in the presence of environmen-
tal problems. Our analysis highlights the following results. Cooperation will
be partial when countries are characterized by only two strategies : to sign an
agreement or to implement no environmental policy. A self-enforcing environ-
mental agreement consists of three countries when the number of countries
involved by the transfrontier problem is large. In case of a failure in nego-
tiation, a precautionary unilateral commitment can emerge when countries
have to choose between unilateral commitment or defection. We also show
that the emergence of non-coordinated global cooperation can result from
a strategic action from the members of the coalition. The existence of the
coalition will create incentives for the outsider countries to reduce emissions
unilaterally. To conclude, when we extend the scope of the countries strate-
gies, we are able to emphasize diﬀerent forms of cooperation. Extensions to
improve this study must nonetheless be envisaged. In fact, throughout our
formulation we have considered identical countries. We would have to relax
this assumption and consider heterogeneous countries (Barrett, 1997a). An-
other way of research would be to investigate interactions between trade and
the environment (Folmer et al, 1993) and to analyse under which conditions
global cooperation is feasible when the cooperating countries can imposed a
15ecological tax on the non-cooperating countries (Barrett, 1997b; P´ ereau and
Tazda¨ ıt, 2000).
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